Judiciary panel moves Coast Guard reauthorization bill

The House Judiciary Committee on Wednesday approved a fiscal 2008 authorization bill for the Coast Guard after adding language to bolster its ability to combat maritime smugglers of illegal immigrants.

The bill (H.R. 2830), which cleared the committee on a voice vote, would also increase funding authorized for the Coast Guard's controversial $24 billion Deepwater program to modernize its fleet, and would ratchet up security at ports and liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities.

The legislation, which cleared the House Homeland Security and Transportation and Infrastructure committees earlier this year, calls for adding $229 million to restore the Deepwater acquisition funding to its fiscal 2007 level of $1.2 billion. But the measure would tighten up the much-maligned management of the program by requiring a civilian to fill the new position of chief acquisition officer and barring Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman from continuing to act as lead contractors for the program.

In addition, the bill calls for the Homeland Security Department to track and assess the cost growth of the first two of the Coast Guard's new national security cutters, and would require that their design be certified by the American Bureau of Shipping. The measure also requires the Coast Guard to tap the Navy's shipbuilding and communications expertise in designing Deepwater vessels.

On an earlier voice vote, the committee, whose jurisdiction over the Coast Guard is limited to its law enforcement powers, approved an amendment offered by House Judiciary Chairman John Conyers, D-Mich., to impose prison terms of up to 10 years on sea-going smugglers who flee Coast Guard patrol boats, up to 10 years in cases where chases result in injuries to the alien passengers, and life in jail in cases of death. Current prison terms for this kind of smuggling average around five years.

"Maritime alien smuggling has become big business because the smugglers have little to lose," said Rep. Howard Coble, R-N.C. Conyers said the bill was especially aimed at the smugglers who ram their boats up on the nearest beach with no regard for the safety of their immigrant passengers to escape arrest.

Similar language passed the House in a unanimous vote earlier this year.

The security provisions of the bill would authorize the Coast Guard to create a Maritime Security Response team on the Pacific Coast to complement the one already assigned to the East Coast. The bill would also authorize pilot programs to test radiological and nuclear detection devices on Coast Guard ships.

In other security initiatives, the bill calls for the Homeland Security Department to conduct comprehensive security reviews before approving new LNG facilities, and would require the Coast Guard to do "comparative risk assessments" for proposed LNG shoreline facilities.

The legislation would also require DHS to submit a progress report to Congress on the effort to establish a transportation worker identification card program, and would direct the Government Accountability Office to do a study of state programs that duplicate background checks for the ID cards.

In addition, the bill would require cruise ships to file prompt reports on missing passengers or violent incidents aboard vessels, and would authorize the DHS to develop a strategic plan for assisting foreign ports that do not have adequate security systems.

COMMENTS

  • Just curious, but why is the judiciary committee involved in this at all? Should not the Coast Guard now be under the Homeland Security Committee?
  • The contractors have not been taken out of the lead integrator role on Deepwater. The language I saw last said that they would keep that role for four more years. While I understand some time is needed to get the CG in the game fours years is way too long. In that time they will release at least one of every asset (ship, plane, helicopter etc) that they have yet to deliver. This includes the NSC - FRCs and OPCs. Once they deliver one and it is accepted the advantage of being the lead integrator will no longer be as important. Once one of each is delivered the designs are locked for the rest of the deliveries of the remaining copies. As is their role in providing those assets. While the Navy stepping up their involvement is a positive step we have already seen that while they will show the ethical fortitude to accuretly test systems and fail what should be failed they do not have the courage to out the CG for illegally waiving failures that they know should not be waived. Ask the Navy and CG about the TEMPEST security waivers from the 123s. In their testimony in April the Navy stated the waivers were not something they approved of. Ask the CG and Navy if the person who waived those failures was legally qualified to do so. He was not. The waivers enable Lockheed to install the exact same failures on the NSC and every other boat due to commonality requirements in the contract. Early testing has already discovered over 350 TEMPEST design flaws on the NSC. A situation the Navy has stated is a critical risk to the project. All of the 123s would have compromised national security. Now all the NSCs are being set up to do the same thing and the Navy, CG and Lockheed know it.
  • The contractors have not been taken out of the lead integrator role on Deepwater. The language I saw last said that they would keep that role for four more years. While I understand some time is needed to get the CG in the game fours years is way too long. In that time they will release at least one of every asset (ship, plane, helicopter etc) that they have yet to deliver. This includes the NSC - FRCs and OPCs. Once they deliver one and it is accepted the advantage of being the lead integrator will no longer be as important. Once one of each is delivered the designs are locked for the rest of the deliveries of the remaining copies. As is their role in providing those assets. While the Navy stepping up their involvement is a positive step we have already seen that while they will show the ethical fortitude to accuretly test systems and fail what should be failed they do not have the courage to out the CG for illegally waiving failures that they know should not be waived. Ask the Navy and CG about the TEMPEST security waivers from the 123s. In their testimony in April the Navy stated the waivers were not something they approved of. Ask the CG and Navy if the person who waived those failures was legally qualified to do so. He was not. The waivers enable Lockheed to install the exact same failures on the NSC and every other boat due to commonality requirements in the contract. Early testing has already discovered over 350 TEMPEST design flaws on the NSC. A situation the Navy has stated is a critical risk to the project. All of the 123s would have compromised national security. Now all the NSCs are being set up to do the same thing and the Navy, CG and Lockheed know it.